In this paper we study the nonzero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time which is a two player non-cooperative game on stopping times. We show that it has a Nash equilibrium point for general stochastic processes. As an application, we consider the problem of pricing American game contingent claims by the utility maximization approach.
Introduction
Dynkin games of zero-sum or nonzero-sum, continuous or discrete time types, are games on stopping times. Since their introduction by E.B. Dynkin in [10] , they have attracted a lot of research activities (see e.g. [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] and the references therein).
To begin with let us describe briefly those game problems. Assume we have a system controlled by two players or agents a 1 and a 2 . The system works or is alive up to the time when one of the agents decides to stop the control at a stopping time τ 1 for a 1 and τ 2 for a 2 . An example of that system is a recallable option in a financial market (see [15, 17] for more details). When the system is stopped the payment for a 1 (resp. a 2 ) amounts to a quantity J 1 (τ 1 , τ 2 ) (resp. J 2 (τ 1 , τ 2 )) which could be negative and then it is a cost. We say that the nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with J 1 and J 2 has a Nash equilibrium point (NEP for short) if there exists a pair of stopping
i.e., the game has a value.
Mainly, in the zero-sum setting, authors aim at proving existence of the value or/and a saddle point for the game while in the nonzero-sum framework they focus on the issue of existence of a NEP for the game.
In continuous time, for decades there have been a lot of works on zero-sum Dynkin games [1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26] . Recently this type of game has attracted a new interest since it has been applied in mathematical finance (see e.g. [3, 15, 16, 17] ) in connection with the pricing of American game options introduced by Y.Kifer in [17] . Comparing with the zero-sum setting, there are much less results on nonzero-sum Dynkin games in the literature. Nevertheless in the Markovian framework, among other papers, one can quote [4, 7, 23, 24] which deal with the nonzero-sum Dynkin game. In non-Markovian framework, E.Etourneau [14] showed that the game has a NEP if some of the processes which define the game (Y 1 and Y 2 of (2.1) below) are supermartingales. Note that even in the Markovian setting, an equivalent condition is supposed. On the other hand, there are some other works which study the existence of approximate equilibrium points (see e.g. [21] ).
The main objective of this work is to study the existence of NEP for nonzero-sum
Dynkin games in non-Markovian framework. For very general processes, we construct an NEP and thus it always exists. This removes the Etourneau's type of conditions and, to our best knowledge, is novel in the literature. Our approach is based on the Snell envelope theory. We next apply our general existence result to price American Game Contingent Claim by the utility maximization approach. Kuhn [18] studied a similar problem by assuming that the agents a 1 and a 2 use only discrete stopping times and exponential utilities. We remove these constraints.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we precise the setting of the problem and give some preliminary results related to the Snell envelope notion.
In Section 3, we construct a sequence of pairs of decreasing stopping times and show that their limit pair is an NEP for the game. Finally in Section 4, we apply the result of Section 3 to price American Game Contingent Claim by the utility maximization approach.
Formulation of the problem
Throughout this paper T is a real positive constant which stands for the horizon of the problem and (Ω, F , P ) is a fixed probability space on which is defined a filtration F := (F t ) 0≤t≤T which satisfies the usual conditions, i.e., it is complete and right continuous.
Next:
-for any F-stopping times θ, let T θ denote the set of F-stopping times τ such that
As pointed out previously, this problem has been studied by several authors in the Markovian framework [4, 7, 23, 24] 
(ii) Assume that U has only positive jumps. Then the stopping time
is optimal, i.e., 
Construction of a Nash Equilibrium Point
In this section we shall construct a sequence of pairs of decreasing stopping times (τ 2n+1 , τ 2n+2 ) and show that their limits (τ * 1 , τ * 2 ) is an NEP. First, notice that Y 1 is only required to be RCLL, and that Y 1 T is never used in (2.1), for notational simplicity at below we will also assume without loss of generality that
We emphasize again that this is just for notational simplicity. Without assuming A4, we may replace the integrands in (3.1) below with
and all the arguments will be the same.
We start with defining τ 1 △ = T and τ 2 △ = T . For n = 1, · · ·, assume τ 2n−1 and τ 2n have been defined, we then define τ 2n+1 and τ 2n+2 as follows. First, let
where and in the sequel E t {·} △ = E{·|F t }, and
Next, let
and
We note that the integrand in (3.1) is slightly different from that of J 1 (τ, τ 2n ) in (2.1).
The main reason is that, in order to apply Lemma 2.3, we need the process U 2n+1 in (3.6) below to be RCLL. But nevertheless we will prove later in Lemma 3.3 that W 2n+1 serves our purpose well. Proof. We prove the following stronger results by induction on n:
Obviously (3.5) holds for n = 1, 2. Assume it is true for 2n − 1 and 2n. We shall prove it for 2n + 1 and 2n + 2.
First, define
Since τ 2n is a stopping time, by Assumptions A1 and A2 we know U 2n+1 is in space
[D] and has only positive jumps. Apply Lemma 2.3, W 2n+1 is the snell envelope of U 2n+1 andτ 2n+1 is the optimal stopping time.
If τ 2n−1 < τ 2n , then by the second claim of (3.5) for 2n − 1 we haveτ 2n+1 ≤ τ 2n−1
and thusτ 2n+1 < τ 2n . This implies that
which, combined with the definition (3.2), implies further that τ 2n+1 is a stopping time.
Next, on {τ 2n+1 < τ 2n+2 }, by definition of τ 2n+2 in (3.4) we have τ 2n+2 = τ 2n . Then
for t ≥ τ 2n+1 and thus
On the other hand, ifτ 2n+1 = τ 2n , by the third claim of (3.5) for 2n, (3.7), and definition of (3.2), we have τ 2n+2 ≤ τ 2n ≤ τ 2n−1 = τ 2n+1 . Thus {τ 2n+1 < τ 2n+2 } ⊂ {τ 2n+1 =τ 2n+1 < τ 2n }, and therefore, by Remark 2.4,
This, together with (3.8), implies that
Now by the definition ofτ 2n+3 in (3.2) we know
Moreover, if τ 2n+3 > τ 2n+1 , by definition (3.2) we have τ 2n+3 =τ 2n+3 < τ 2n+2 .
Then τ 2n+1 <τ 2n+3 < τ 2n+2 . This contradicts with (3.9). Therefore, τ 2n+3 ≤ τ 2n+1 .
Finally, one can prove (3.5) for 2n + 2 similarly.
Following is another important property of the stopping times τ n .
Lemma 3.2 Assume Assumptions A1 and A2. On {τ n = τ n−1 }, we have τ m = T for all m ≤ n.
Proof. The result is obvious for n = 2. Assume it is true for n. Now for n + 1, on {τ n+1 = τ n }, by the definition of τ n+1 in (3.2) or (3.4) we have τ n+1 = τ n−1 . Then τ n = τ n−1 and thus by induction assumption we get the result.
Next lemma shows that τ n is the optimal stopping time for some problem.
Lemma 3.3 Assume Assumptions A1, A2 and A4. For any τ ∈ T 0 and any n we have: 
On the other hand, by Lemma 3.2 and Assumption A4 we have
By (3.2), (3.7), and then by Remark 2.4, we get
This, together with (3.11), proves J 1 (τ, τ 2n ) ≤ J 1 (τ 2n+1 , τ 2n ).
Similarly we can prove J 2 (τ 2n+1 , τ ) ≤ J 2 (τ 2n+1 , τ 2n+2 ). We shall prove that (τ * 1 , τ * 2 ) is an NEP. We divide the proof into several lemmas.
Lemma 3.4 Assume Assumptions A1 and A2.
(i) For any τ ∈ T 0 , we have lim
(ii) Since {τ < τ 2n+1 } ⊂ {τ < T }, we have
Moreover, note that τ * 1 ≤ τ 2n+1 , then {τ * 1 = T } ⊂ {τ 2n+1 = T }. Applying the assumption P (τ = τ * 1 < T ) = 0 twice we have
Note that
where
On the other hand, set
Then τ ∈ T 0 and P (τ = τ * 1 < T ) = 0. By Lemma 3.4 (ii) we have
By Lemma 3.3, we get I ≥ 0. Now by Assumption A2 we have
Then (3.14) implies (3.13).
(ii) It remains to prove
Similar to (3.14) we have
By Assumption A2, we get from (3.16) that
Applying the third claim in Lemma 3.1 we have {τ 2n < τ 2n+1 } ⊂ {τ 2n+2 < τ 2n+1 }.
Then by Assumption A3 we have
Then (3.18) leads to (3.17) immediately.
We are now ready to show that (τ * 1 , τ * 2 ) is an NEP.
Proof of Theorem 2.2.
We recall again that Assumption A4 is just for notational simplicity. So in the proof we may assume it.
First, by Lemma 3.4 (i), Lemma 3.5, and Lemma 3.3, we have
Similarly, for any τ such that P (τ = τ * 1 < T ) = 0, we have
In the general case, for any τ ∈ T 0 , set
Thenτ n is a stopping time and P (τ n = τ
It is by now well-known that an American contingent claim is a contract which allows its holder to exercise at a time she decides before or at the maturity. The only role of its issuer is to provide, if any, the pledged wealth to the buyer. In contrary, an American game contingent claim (ACC for short) is mainly an American contingent claim where the issuer is also allowed to recall/cancel the contract. Actually assume that a 1 (resp. a 2 ) is the issuer (resp. buyer) of the ACC. Both sides are allowed to exercise. Therefore it enables a 1 to terminate it and a 2 to exercise it at any time up to maturity date T when the contract is expired anyway. Also if a 2 decides to exercise at σ or a 1 to terminate at τ then a 1 pays to a 2 the amount:
where:
-σ and τ are two F-stopping times -L and U are F-adapted continuous processes such that L ≤ U. The quantity L σ (resp. U τ ) is the amount that obtains a 2 (resp. pays a 1 ) for her decision to exercise (resp. cancel) first at σ (resp. τ ). The difference U − L represents the compensation that a 1 pays to a 2 for the decision to terminate the contract before maturity date T -ξ is an F T -random variable which satisfies L T ≤ ξ ≤ U T . It stands for the money that a 1 pays to a 2 if both accept to terminate the GCC at maturity date T .
For this contingent claim, the seller a 1 (resp. buyer a 2 ) aims at maximizing (resp. minimizing) her cost (resp. reward) in expectation, i.e., the quantity:
where E[.] is the expectation under the probability P on the space (Ω, F ).
Game contingent claims are introduced by Y.Kifer in [17] in the framework of the Black and Scholes model. Since then, there have been several papers on the same subject [3, 15, 16] . In a complete market, it is shown in those works that the nonarbitrage price V 0 of the GCC is equal to the zero-sum Dynkin game associated with L and U, i.e.,
Another point of view for pricing American game options, especially in incomplete markets and in connection with the utility maximization approach, is introduced by C.Kuhn in [18] and which is the following:
Let ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 : IR → IR be non-decreasing and concave functions. Those functions stand for utility functions of the seller, respectively, the buyer of the GCC. The seller a 1 (resp. the buyer a 2 ) chooses a stopping time τ (resp. σ) in order to maximize , σ) )]).
Therefore if the nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with J 1 and J 2 has a Nash equilibrium point (σ * , τ * ), i.e., J 1 (τ * , σ * ) ≥ J 1 (τ, σ * ) and J 2 (τ * , σ * ) ≥ J 2 (τ * , σ)
2 (J 2 (τ * , σ * ))) is a seller (resp. buyer) price of the GCC.
Note that if ϕ 1 (x) = ϕ 2 (x) = x, ∀x ∈ IR, i.e. the agents a 1 and a 2 are risk-neutral, then the nonzero-sum game is actually a zero-sum Dynkin game, (τ * , σ * ) is a saddlepoint for this game and −J 1 (τ * , σ * ) = J 2 (τ * , σ * ). Moreover this latter quantity is the value of the game. For more details on zero-sum Dynkin games one can see e.g. [1, 5, 8, 15, 19, 20, 25, 26] . So pricing the GCC described above turns into the existence of a NEP for the associated nonzero-sum Dynkin game. In [18] , based on the article by Morimoto [22] , the author has just been able to show the existence of that NEP in the set of discrete stopping times and exponential utility functions. Also using the result of the previous section, we are able to fill in the gap between the discrete stopping times used in [18] and continuous ones which we use here and, on the other hand, to allow for arbitrary utility functions for the agents. Actually we have: 
